The Syrian civil war is a dark stain on our global conscience. 470,000 deaths at the start of 2017 and counting. “Burning country” is an indispensable read for anyone who wants to learn about the Syrian revolution. It is a relatively short read but packed full of invaluable facts, data and interviews from a wide range of the key players. It is quite dense and information heavy. I make notes for all of the books that I read and this generated an unusually large amount, considering the fact it is 230 pages long. There is a lot of disinformation written about Syria. If you want an accurate and truthful account of the revolution: look no further.
The book starts off by giving us a brief history of the major episodes in Syrian history. The Ottoman empire rule from 1516-1917, the French occupation until 1946. Also the brief period between 1948 and 1954 where free elections were held for the first time and it looked like Syria would turn democratic. Viewing it through the lens of the 2011 revolution, did this brief taste with democracy inspire the next generation? The deep impact the 1967 Israel-Arab war is chronicled, especially the actions of the defence minister at the time – one Hafez al-Assad and his rise to power in 1970. Hafez’s vicious regime is exposed throughout. The massacre of 20,000 at Homs in 1982 drew particular attention to the way in which history would violently repeat itself in Syria.
After coming to power in 2000, there were hopes for Syria transforming out of its autocratic past as Hafez’s son was seen in some quarters as a reformer when he allowed the internet to spread and a number of civil societies to grow. The Damascus spring in 2001 is written about as a precursor to the revolution and how, initially, it was only a small band of Syrian intellectuals who called for their society to be opened up and paved the path for the revolution to happen in earnest in the future. It quickly became apparent that Bashar was cut from the same cloth as his father. His regime’s corruption was there for all to see: his cousin Rami Makhlouf owned 60% of the state’s businesses. This while a lot of ordinary Syrians were living in near poverty. That is the backdrop as the 2005 Damascus agreement was signed – which called on Bashar to transition Syria to a democracy.
The revolution begins:
January 2011. Syrians begin calling for their right to self determination by organising peaceful protests. They test the waters to see how the regime will react. There are two protests arranged for the 4th and 5th of February. Nobody turned up because people wanted to see what form of state presence the government would send. Fully armed riot police turned up. On the 6th March, fifteen children are arrested for spraying graffiti. They are kidnapped, tortured and their nails torn out. The parents are outraged. Thousands of people peacefully call for the release of the children. The regime opens up with live ammunition on the gathering, killing four innocent people. These are the first deaths of the Syrian uprising. The book is crystal clear that all of these early oppositions of the regime are non violent. A big crowd marched at the death of the four Protestors and they tore down a statue of Hafez Al-Assad in Sanamayan. The regime countered by killing twenty civilians. Syrians are absolutely shocked that the army would indiscriminately kill innocent protestors. Even after the regime goes on multiple killing sprees, the revolutionaries are still calling for peaceful demonstrations and not to militarise. A critical juncture is the speech that Assad gives on the 30th March. A lot of people gave him the benefit of the doubt up to this point. Would he show remorse? When he did not and came across as aloof and out of touch, Syrians begin to contemplate what to do next. When the aptly named “Comical Sally” from the regime passed off 10,000 Syrian refugees that had fled into Turkey as them just wanting to “visit relatives”, the people knew that they were being lied to. Along with the aimless killing, this mistrust is fundamental to what came next.
Why did the revolution militarise?
By December 2011, the regime has begun raping women in front of their families in their homes in rebel areas. The threat of sexual violence is added to the menace of daily bloodshed. Syrians were living in terror. As the authors say, the people still did not want to take up arms but there was a “logical realisation that civil resistance was not enough”. The people had no option but to defend themselves and their families, street by street. They took up arms spontaneously, as a result of the cruelty.
Every Syrian male had at least one years military training so they knew the basics of how to use a weapon etc. This made it easier for them to take up arms when they felt they had no option. The arming of local neighbourhoods happened instinctively in self defence.
On the 4th June 2011, during a funeral for twenty people that the regime killed on the 20th May previous, the government forces were told to open fire. Some of the Syrian army that day refused to kill their own people. When large numbers of them refused, they were in turn killed themselves. This led to large scale defections from the army to the side of the civilians.
The role of Jihadists and Islamists in the revolution:
The long chapter on this in the book is superb and lifts the lid on a complex issue. From March to October 2011, as the revolution had begun, the regime released 1500 well connected Salafists from prison. The authors explain that “The regime wanted to tell the world it was fighting Al Qaeda but the revolution was peaceful in the beginning so it had to begin an armed Islamic revolt”. I found it hard to understand this when looking at the revolution from a 2017 standpoint. It was a major strategic error from Assad.
The book cites opinion polls about how many Syrians wanted a religious state. It was never higher than 30%. So extremism was never that prevalent before 2011. When you listen to the regime today, they talk about how it is them versus the terrorists. Assad wants us to believe that those are the only options. As if the Free Syrian Army (FSA) does not exist. “Burning country” explains how Assad was absolutely complicit in the later actions of the Salafists:
“There was nothing fated about the sectarian breakdown in Syria. It was deliberately provoked and manipulated, by a host of secondary actors but primarily by the regime. Why would the regime provoke first armed resistance and then a fierce sectarian backlash? Because Assadist policy under father and son, at home and abroad, is to present itself as the essential solution to problems it has itself manufactured- a case of the arsonist dressing up as the fireman”
There we have it. Think of when Aleppo fell at the end of 2016. He managed to convince a large portion of the media that it was either him or the “terrorists”. This Assad propaganda is a deception. He tries to classify anyone against him under this umbrella.
So, back to why extreme Islamist and Jihadist groups like Jabhat Al Nusra and Jaysh Al Islam etc. first took root:
- The FSA had little or no money. Qatar and Saudi backed the newly freed Salafists as a means to furthering their own regional agenda. This meant that they had weapons in local areas when sometimes the locals did not.
- The FSA was subject to corruption in the local areas it ran. The Jihadists were extremely organised, disciplined and battle weary from their experience in other conflicts like Iraq.
- The lack of an international response, especially after the Sarin gas attack in 2013 in Ghouta, meant that people felt that they had no choice. They accepted over the course of the first two years that nobody was coming to save them. They had harboured a belief that the West would intervene up until then.
ISIS also shipped a lot of fighters into Syria at the start of the revolution as they sensed an opportunity. They came in from multiple countries such as Chechnya. Suddenly black flags begun to appear and ISIS took root in local cities. After they captured Mosul and large parts of the border area between Iraq and Syria, they became powerful agents. The authors write that it went underreported that the FSA fought against ISIS and drove them from lots of areas. Assad and the regime played up to the image of fighting ISIS but actually rarely attacked them. His logic was that the West would take them out so he could focus on taking out the FSA.
The shout for democracy:
This theme is explored at length in the book. We learn what the crowds at demonstrations in Homs, Deraa and Deir Al Zor chanted while they protested :”God, Syria & freedom” and how this was a rewording of the official regime chant of “God, Syria and Bashar”. It is clear what the majority of the peaceful protestors wanted.
Initially, the people called for:
Yabroud, a city 90KM North of Damascus, held its own free elections. It set up its own secular government. Amidst all the propaganda from the regime, this is what they tried to suppress more than anything: the cries from the people for the right to determine their own future. The NCB (National coordination committee of the forces of democratic change) also tried to reason with the regime for a transition to fair elections. Of course their voice was ignored.
In the face of these calls for the right to determine their own future, the authors highlight the disgusting levels of savagery the regime will go to just to maintain power. It deliberately starved many rebel controlled areas forcing people to eat weeds and stray animals.
The book details the crucial role women have played and how this went under the radar, especially as the Jihadists took control. The book details: